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The New American Civil Religion: 







 Alessandro Ferrari nicely delineates the predicament 
of civil religion in Italy:  centered around a Catholicism 
that is no longer universal enough to be a basis for 
national identity.1  The problems he describes are not 
peculiar to Italy.  Much of what he complains of has 
analogues that are familiar to me as an American lawyer who 
studies the law of religion in the United States.  We have 
a civil religion of our own, with its own gaps, 
incoherences, and exclusions.  Most pertinently here, 
American civil religion has been changing, responding to 
increasing religious plurality by becoming more abstract.  
Perhaps Italy has, in this respect, an American future. 
 
I.  Why Civil Religion? 
 
Why is there civil religion at all?  What’s the point 
of these bland, watered-down rituals? 
The idea of a civil religion is commonly traced to 
Rousseau,2 with a prominent recent updating by Robert 
Bellah,3 but the fundamental idea was offered much earlier 
by Augustine, who wrote:  “A people is the association of a 
multitude of rational beings united by common agreement on 
the objects of their love.”4  Augustine was transforming an 
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1 Alessandro Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy:  A “Mission Impossible”?, 
George Washington Int’l L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).   
2 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. 1V, ch. 8, 124-32 (Roger D. 
Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762). 
3 Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 Daedalus 1 (Winter, 
1967). 
4 Augustine, City of God 19.24, at 890 (Henry Bettenson trans. 1972). 
 2
earlier definition by Cicero of a community as an 
“association of men united by a common sense of right and a 
community of interest.”  A people’s character, Augustine 
thought, was determined by the objects of its love:  “the 
better the objects of agreement, the better the people.”5  
Augustine didn’t think that a people united around 
genuinely attractive objects, even a common sense of 
justice, could exist in this world:  in any earthly 
republic, good people would be forced to coexist with evil 
ones.  A regime was more like a band of thieves, cohesive 
out of necessity.6  It took more recent developments to 
produce a politics that sought to realize Augustine’s ideal 
in this world – not in the sense of a commonwealth ruled by 
God, but in the sense of an association united by common 
agreement on the (worthy!) object of their love. 
Why has an Augustinian ideal become practically 
important today?  Charles Taylor argues that cohesion has 
become more important because of the needs of modern 
representative democracy.  “Traditional despotisms could 
ask of people only that they remain passive and obey the 
laws.  A democracy . . . has to ask more.  It requires that 
its members be motivated to make the necessary 
contributions:  of treasure (in taxes), sometimes blood (in 
war), and always of some degree of participation in the 
process of governance.”7  This is why states try to 
inculcate a sense of patriotism. 
This imperative toward a common identity, Taylor 
observes, pushes the state in two different directions.  
State builders have reached toward secularism, an ethic 
independent of confessional differences, “as a potential 
common point of allegiance for citizens, above and beyond 
their other differences.”8  But at the same time, the 
imperative to bond citizens together can create “an all-
but-irresistable pull to build the common identity around 
the things that strongly unite people, and these are 
frequently ethnic or religious identities.”9  In the 
limiting case, “the logic of democracy can become that of 
ethnic cleansing.”10  Thus democracy does not necessarily 
entail liberalism.  “Rather it ups the ante:  either the 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Herbert Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine 116-53 
(1963). 
7 Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in Secularism and Its Critics 43 
(Rajeev Bhargava, ed., 1998). 
8 Id. at 44. 
9 Id. at 46. 
10 Id. at 48. 
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civilized coexistence of diverse groups, or new forms of 
savagery.”11 
The aim, then, is a middle way between a civic 
identity so deracinated that it has no roots in the 
specific history of the people it seeks to bind together, 
and one so specific that it excludes recent immigrants.  
Constructing and maintaining this identity is a delicate 
operation, and its demands shift over time as the pertinent 
population shifts. 
Even when civil religion succeeds in performing its 
unifying function, it can still generate pathologies.  
American civil religion is an example.  It does produce a 
culture in which many people feel that their religious 
beliefs are somehow associated with patriotism.  This has 
the salutary effect of fostering civic unity and common 
moral ideals and tempering religious fanaticism.  It also 
has the less attractive effect of encouraging self-
righteous nationalism and the idea that whatever the United 
States does, however repugnant, is somehow divinely 
sanctioned.12   
 I have not mentioned one desideratum that is typically 
overvalued in the academy:  intellectual tidiness.  Civil 
religion is always likely to be somewhat incoherent, 
because it will have been cobbled together for ends that 
are not intellectual.  That does not mean that there is 
anything wrong with it.  The American civil religion, for 
example, is decidedly untidy but largely does its job, 
albeit with the pathologies I have just mentioned. 
More pertinently, American civil religion is changing.  
It is becoming more abstract and therefore more inclusive.  
This, I will argue, is a sensible response to the 
fragmentation of religion caused by immigration, which is 
an issue all over the world.  In what follows, I will 
describe America’s civil religion and then offer some 
possible lessons for Italy. 
 
II.  The Old American Civil Religion 
 
Here are some familiar and well-settled rules of 
American Establishment Clause law.  The state may not 
engage in speech that endorses a particular religion, or 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 See Jeffrey James Poelvoorde, The American Civil Religion and the 
American Constitution, in How Does the Constitution Protect Religious 
Freedom? 141 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds. 1987).  For recent 
examples of the latter unattractive effect, see Andrew Koppelman, 
Reading Lolita at Guantanamo, 53 Dissent 64 (Spring, 2006).   
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religion generally.13  It may not use a religious test for 
office.14  A law is invalid if it lacks a secular 
legislative purpose,15 or if it purposefully discriminates 
against certain religious practices.16  Laws may not 
discriminate among religions.17 
 Yet at the same time, there is a broad range of 
official religious practices that are tolerated.  “In God 
We Trust” appears on the currency, legislative sessions 
begin with prayers, judicial proceedings begin with “God 
save the United States and this Honorable Court,” 
Thanksgiving and Christmas are official holidays, and, of 
course, the words “under God” appear in the Pledge of 
Allegiance.  The Court has sometimes claimed that these 
practices of ceremonial deism are not really religious, but 
that is a silly argument, since they are overtly and 
conspicuously religious.18 
Only recently has anyone on the Court articulated a 
principle that purports to distinguish permissible from 
impermissible deism.  The general rule now seems to be that 
old forms of deism are grandfathered, but newer ones are 
unconstitutional.  Thus, the Court recently held that an 
official Ten Commandments display is unconstitutional if it 
was erected recently, but not if it has been around for 
decades.19  Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence in a 
decision concerning the inclusion of the words “under God” 
in the Pledge of Allegiance,20 explicitly made the age of a 
ceremonial acknowledgement relevant to its 
constitutionality.  She thought that constitutionality was 
supported by the absence of worship or prayer, the absence 
of reference to a particular religion, and minimal 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
14 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
15 See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002), and 
cases discussed therein. 
16 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
17 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
18 This is elegantly argued by Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of 
Church and State:  A Critical Analysis of Religion Clause Jurisprudence 
62-80 (1995). 
19 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)(invalidating 
recently erected display); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) 
(upholding 40-year-old display).  Justice Breyer, the only judge in the 
majority in both cases, relied on the divisiveness rationale in 
explaining his position.  See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700-04 (Breyer, 
J., concurring).  I will argue here that there are better grounds for 
his position than the ones he states. 
20 Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 33-45 
(2004)(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).   
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religious content.  But the first of her factors was 
“history and ubiquity.”  “The constitutional value of 
ceremonial deism turns on a shared understanding of its 
legitimate nonreligious purposes,” O’Connor wrote.  “That 
sort of understanding can exist only when a given practice 
has been in place for a significant portion of the Nation's 
history, and when it is observed by enough persons that it 
can fairly be called ubiquitous.”21  The consequence is to 
make old and familiar forms of ceremonial deism 
constitutional, but to discourage innovation.   
There are two aspects of this area of the law that 
distinguish it. 
 The first is that it represented a common ground 
strategy - an effort, in its own time, to understand 
“religion” in an ecumenical and nonsectarian way.  At the 
time that these elements of civil religion were put in 
place, the existence of God appeared to be the one aspect 
of religion that was common to the various religious 
factions then dominant in American life.  This was true of 
the vague deism embraced in the Declaration of Independence 
and the speeches of the Presidents, beginning with 
Washington; it was also true of the idea of a “Judeo-
Christian” ethic that was invented in the 1950s.22  This old 
settlement is part of the background in which contemporary 
American religion has developed.  Its continuation is not 
an effort by an incumbent administration to manipulate 
religion or a triumphalist effort to exclude outsiders.  It 
simply recognizes that people are invested, in some cases 
very deeply, in the status quo.23 
The second is that new manifestations are not at all 
ecumenical.  America was once an overwhelmingly Protestant 
nation.  Today it remains majority Christian, but 
monotheism is no longer universal.  There are a lot of 
Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists.  If you add up the 
Protestants, Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
Orthodox, Jews, Muslims, and Unitarians in the 2009 
                                                 
21 Id. at 37. 
22 See Mark Silk, Spiritual Politics:  Religion and America Since World 
War II 40-53 (1988); Noah Feldman, Divided By God:  America’s Church-
State Problem – And What We Should Do About It 164-70 (2005).  
Nonsectarian Bible reading was a less attractive and less successful 
variant, since it quickly became inflected with anti-Catholicism.  See 
Feldman at 61-92, 108-110. 
23 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 1227 (2003). 
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Statistical Abstract of the United States, you end up with 
only 81% of the population.24 
 Today, the invocation of theism, and specifically the 
erection of a Ten Commandments display, is an intervention 
in the bitterest religious controversies that now divide 
us.  Douglas Laycock thinks that a lesson of O’Connor’s 
opinion is that “separationist groups should sue 
immediately when they encounter any religious practice 
newly sponsored by the government.”25  That is precisely the 
right lesson for them to take.  New sponsorship of 
religious practices is far more likely to represent a 
contemporaneous effort to intervene in a live religious 
controversy than the perpetuation of old forms. 
The theological content of the civil religion has been 
becoming steadily thinner.  Descriptions by two 
sociologists, twenty years apart, show the direction of 
change. 
 Robert Bellah observed in 1967 that there are 
“certain common elements of religious orientation that the 
great majority of Americans share” and that “provide a 
religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, 
including the political sphere.”26  This orientation, which 
he labeled “the American civil religion,”27 included as its 
tenets “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward 
of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of 
                                                 
24 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2009 
(129th ed. 2008), tbl. 74, at 59.  Further data on non-monotheists are 
compiled in Frederick Mark Gedicks and Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion:  
Judeo-Christianity and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 275, 
284-85 (2007).   
The Statistical Abstract lists 16.1% as “unaffiliated,” which it 
defines as “atheist, agnostic, and nothing in particular,” but the 
numbers are in fact a bit more complicated than this suggests.  The 
proportion of Americans who report having no religious preference 
doubled in the 1990s, from 7 percent in 1991 (which had been its level 
for almost 20 years) to 14 percent in 1998.  However, most of the 
members of this category are in fact religious.  More than half believe 
in God, more than half believe in life after death, about a third 
believe in heaven and hell, and 93 percent sometimes pray.  The most 
careful study of this group concludes that the newer members of this 
group are mostly “unchurched believers” who declare no religious 
preference in an effort to express their distance from the Religious 
Right.  Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No 
Religious Preference:  Politics and Generations, 67 Am. Sociological 
Rev. 165 (2002). 
25 Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and 
Religious Liberty:  Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 155, 232 (2004).   
26 Bellah, Civil Religion in America, supra note __, at 3-4. 
27 Id. at 4. 
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religious intolerance.”28  This civil religion does not, 
however, include such controversial matters as the divinity 
of Jesus Christ.  “The God of the civil religion is not 
only rather ‘unitarian,’ he is also on the austere side, 
much more related to order, law, and right than to 
salvation and love.”29 
 Robert Wuthnow observed in 1988 that the American 
civil religion described by Bellah had been fragmenting in 
recent years into two very different visions.30  A 
conservative narrative holds that America’s government is 
legitimate because it reflects biblical principles and has 
the potential to evangelize the world.  A liberal narrative 
holds that America has a responsibility to use its vast 
resources to alleviate the material problems that face the 
world.  In this liberal narrative, “[f]aith plays a role 
chiefly as a motivating element, supplying strength to keep 
going against what often appear as insuperable odds.”31  The 
two visions have become increasingly hostile to one 
another.  As a consequence, neither can effectively claim 
to speak for common American values. 
 
III.  The New American Civil Religion 
 
 The American civic religion would thus appear to be 
paralyzed.  It is not.  A new American civil religion is 
emerging, readily visible on the statute books, more 
abstract than its predecessor but with definite 
consequences. 
The most important recent innovation in symbolic 
endorsement is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and 
its cognates, at the federal and state level.  The RFRA 
laws pervasively single out religion for special treatment 
in the law.  They require courts to consider religious (and 
only religious) accommodation claims, and to grant them 
unless there is some very strong state interest to the 
contrary.  The Federal RFRA was invalidated by the Supreme 
Court as applied to state and local government, but 
continues to apply to federal action.  The Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act protects religion 
(and only religion) from land use and prison regulations.  
Similar protections against state law are given by many 
state constitutions and state Religious Freedom Restoration 
                                                 
28 Id. at 5. 
29 Id. at 7. 
30 See Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion 241-67 
(1988). 
31 Id. at 251. 
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Acts.32  There are thousands of exemptions in specific 
statutory schemes, and the Supreme Court has held that 
these are permissible even when they are not 
constitutionally required.33 
The sentiment in favor of such accommodations is 
nearly unanimous in the United States.  When Congress 
enacted RFRA, the bill passed unanimously in the House and 
drew only three opposing votes in the Senate.34   
 It is surprisingly uncertain what is the object of all 
this protection.  None of the RFRAs offer a definition of 
religion, and some of them reject usage that identifies it 
with conscience (which is the substitute most commonly 
offered by those who object to singling out religion).  The 
most recent Congressional pronouncement on religious 
liberty, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000, declares that “[t]he term ‘religious 
exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious 
belief.”35 
 A vague understanding of “religion” seems to be 
unavoidable.  The best treatments of the problem of 
defining “religion” for constitutional purposes, most 
prominently that of Kent Greenawalt, have concluded that no 
dictionary definition will do, because no single feature 
unites all the things that are indisputably religions. 
Religions just have a “family resemblance” to one another. 
In doubtful cases, one can only ask how close the analogy 
is between a putative instance of religion and the 
indisputable instances.36 
                                                 
32 For a survey, see Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge 
of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:  Avoiding the Extremes but 
Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 211-12 & nn.368-73 (2004). 
33 All this is documented in Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of 
Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 3-6, 19-21 (2000). 
34 Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:  A Critique of 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 160 (1997). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).  Some of the state statutes mandating 
religious accommodation have similar language.  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §41-1493 (West 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann. §761.02 (West Supp. 2004); 
Idaho Code §73-401 (Michie Supp. 2004); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 35/5 
(West 2001 & Supp. 2004); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§1.302 (West Supp. 2004); 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§110.001 (West Supp. 2004).  But see 
71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§2403 (West Supp. 2004)(adopting a more 
restrictive definition of a substantial burden). 
36 I have elaborated this point in Corruption of Religion and the 
Establishment Clause, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1831, 1905-08 (2009).  See 
also William P. Alston, Religion, in 7 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 142 
(Paul Edwards ed. 1967); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for 
the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 Geo. L.J. 1519 (1983); 
Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. 
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This process need not yield indeterminacy.  The concept 
of “family resemblance” is drawn from the philosophy of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously argued that “the meaning 
of a word is its use in the language.”37  Thus, for example, 
there is no single thing common to “games” which makes them 
all games, but “similarities, relationships, and a whole 
series of them at that.”38  The use of the word “game” is 
thus not circumscribed by any clear rule.  But that does 
not mean that it is not circumscribed at all.  “[N]o more 
are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in 
tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all of that 
and has rules too.”39 
Explaining Wittgenstein’s idea here, Charles Taylor 
observes that, with respect to a great many rule-guided 
social practices, 
the “rule” lies essentially in the practice.  The rule 
is what is animating the practice at any given time, and 
not some formulation behind it, inscribed in our 
thoughts or our brains or our genes, or whatever.  
That’s why the rule is, at any time, what the practice 
has made it.40 
The rules of appropriate comportment when riding on a bus, 
for instance, are not codified anywhere.  But natives of 
the culture may understand quite well what they are, and 
there may be no doubt at all as to how they apply in 
particular cases, even if they have not been codified and 
could not be codified.41 
                                                                                                                                                 
L. Rev. 753 (1984); Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1181-83 
(2d ed. 1988); Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 
Yale L.J. 791 (1997); 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution:  
Free Exercise and Fairness 124-156 (2006); Andrew Koppelman, Secular 
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 125-139 (2002).  Courts in Europe have done 
no better in devising a definition.  Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious 
Freedom in the Liberal State 110-26 (2005).  Indeed, it appears that no 
jurisdiction in the world has managed to solve this problem. See T. 
Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of 
“Religion” in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189 (2003).  Lest 
one think that the neo-Wittgensteinian approach advocated here is an 
artifact of academic preciousness, note that an analogical criterion is 
also used by that singularly hardheaded entity, the Internal Revenue 
Service.  See Defining “Religious Organization” and “Church,” 868 EST., 
GIFTS & TR. PORTFOLIOS (BNA) ch. III (2007), available at 
http://taxandaccounting. bna.com/btac/. 
37 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1958). 
38 Id. at 31. 
39 Id. at 33. 
40 Charles Taylor, To Follow a Rule, in Philosophical Arguments 178 
(1995). 
41 See Al Yankovic, Another One Rides the Bus (Placebo Records 1981). 
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 The definition of religion in American law works just 
this way.  There is no set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions that will make something a “religion.”  But it 
is remarkable how few cases have arisen in which courts 
have had real difficulty in determining whether something 
is a religion or not.42 
One possible way of promoting religious neutrality, 
while still maintaining a civil religion, is to 
conceptualize the good of religion at a very high level of 
abstraction.  Neutrality is fluid; it is available in many 
specifications.43   
The American approach is one defensible specification.  
The state is agnostic about religion, but it is an 
interested and sympathetic agnosticism.  The state does not 
say “I don’t know and you don’t either.”  Rather it 
declares the value of religion in a carefully noncommittal 
way:  “It would be good to find out.  And we encourage your 
efforts to do that.” 
The precise character of the good being promoted is 
itself deliberately left vague, because the broad consensus 
on freedom of religion would surely collapse if we had to 
state with specificity the value promoted by religion.  
“Religion” denotes a cluster of goods, including salvation 
(if you think you need to be saved), harmony with the 
transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists),44 
responding to the fundamentally imperfect character of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 As Jonathan Z. Smith has observed, the term “religion” denotes an 
anthropological category, arising out of a particular Western practice 
of encountering and accounting for foreign belief systems associated 
with geopolitical entities with which the West was forced to deal.  
Religion, Religions, Religious, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies 
269 (Mark C. Taylor ed. 1998).  Arising thus out of a specific 
historical situation, and evolving in unpredictable ways thereafter, 
“religion” would be surprising if it had any essential denotation. 
42 The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of 
“religion” is a remarkably short one.  See Religion, 36C Words and 
Phrases 153-57 (2002 & supp. 2008).  The reference I rely on here, 
Words and Phrases, is a 132 volume set collecting brief annotations of 
cases from 1658 to the present.  Each case discusses the contested 
definition of a word whose meaning determines rights, duties, 
obligations, and liabilities of the parties.  See Words and Phrases, in 
West's Encyclopedia of American Law (2d ed. 2008).  Some words have 
received an enormous amount of attention from the courts.  Two 
examples, drawn at random from the first volume of this immense 
compilation, each exceed 100 pages:  Abandonment, 1 Words and Phrases 
37-147 (2007); Abuse of Discretion, id. at 323-462 and, in the 2008 
supplement, 8-25. 
43 See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. OF POLITICS 
633 (2004). 
44 John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 89-90 (1980). 
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human life (if it is imperfect),45 courage in the face of 
the heartbreaking aspects of human existence (if that kind 
of encouragement helps),46 a transcendent underpinning for 
the resolution to act morally (if that kind of underpinning 
helps),47 contact with that which is awesome and 
indescribable (if awe is something you feel),48 and many 
others.  No general description of the good that religion 
seeks to promote can be satisfactory, politically or 
intellectually.49  The establishment clause permits the 
state to favor religion so long as “religion” is understood 
very broadly, forbidding any discrimination or preference 
among religions or religious propositions.  
 By grandfathering the old civil religion, and saying 
that it could proceed as far as it has and no further, the 
Supreme Court has essentially declared it immune from 
further tinkering.  The new civil religion, on the other 
hand, continues to generate new law and new procedures.  
Religion is a topic that incumbent administrations must now 
remain silent about.  It is even more abstract than 
Bellah’s Unitarian civic God.  It is a negative God, a God 
without predicates.50  It reveals its reverence for the 
Absolute by omitting all reference to it in public 
decisionmaking.  The aspiration evidently is for an 
eloquent silence, like a rest in music. 
 
IV.  A Model for Italy? 
 
Prof. Ferrari’s paper focuses on two persistent 
questions that plague American as well as Italian law.  Can 
                                                 
45 Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction 
17-34 (1999). 
46 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (1952). 
47 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788; Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Religion Within the Limits of Reason 
Alone (1794; New York:  Harper, 1960). 
48 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (2d ed. 1950). 
49 Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of 
religion: 
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be 
established.  I mean a theory which can gather all the powerful 
élans and aspirations which humans have manifested in the 
spiritual realm, and relate them to some single set of underlying 
needs or aims or tendencies (whether it be the desire for meaning 
or something else).  The phenomena are much too varied and 
baffling for that; and even if they were more tractable, we would 
have to stand at the end of history to be able to draw such 
conclusions. 
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 679 (2007). 
50 See Anthony Kenny, Worshipping an Unknown God, 19 Ratio (n.s.) 441 
(2006). 
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the state symbolically endorse religion, and if so, of what 
kind?  Can the state fund religious activity, either as 
such or as part of a broader program of funding to which 
religious claimants are incidentally entitled?   
 
A.  Symbolic endorsement 
 
The Italian state has for a long time used the symbols 
of the Catholic Church as the basis of its civic identity.  
With growing diversity,51 Catholicism can no longer perform 
this unifying function.  Prof. Ferrari’s paper nicely 
delineates the problem.  It won’t do to say, as Italian 
officials now do, that the crucifix is just a symbol of 
tradition.  This move is bound to produce controversy, 
because the symbol in question is so inescapably specific.  
And it has in fact been the occasion of bitter division.52 
                                                 
51 The U.S. State Department reports: 
An estimated 87 percent of native-born citizens are nominally 
Catholic, but only 20 percent regularly participate in worship 
services. Other significant Christian communities include 
Orthodox, Jehovah's Witnesses, Assembly of God, the Confederation 
of Methodist and Waldensian Churches, the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and other small Protestant 
groups. Non-Catholic Christian groups, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, 
Baha'is, and Buddhists constitute less than 5 percent of the 
population and, with the exception of Jews, are mainly foreign-
born. Immigration, both legal and illegal, continues to add large 
numbers of non-Christian residents, mainly Muslims, from North 
Africa, South Asia, Albania, and the Middle East. The Ministry of 
Interior reports that there are 258 places of Islamic worship 
(mainly "garage" mosques) and 628 Islamic associations 
concentrated in Lombardy, Veneto, Lazio, Emilia Romagna, and 
Tuscany. The Jewish community is estimated at 30,000 and 
maintains synagogues in 21 cities. The most recent data indicate 
that approximately 14 percent of the population identifies itself 
as either atheist or agnostic. (Numbers do not add up to 100 
percent because of overlapping categories.) 
International Religious Freedom Report 2008, U.S. State Dept. Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Sept. 19, 2008, available at 
http://italy.usembassy.gov/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2008_09/alia
/a8091901.htm. 
52 The State Department reports: 
On February 7, 2007, former Justice Minister Mastella said the 
crucifix was a symbol of traditional Italian culture and values 
and therefore could be displayed in public buildings. On February 
21, 2008, courts condemned a judge to 1 year's imprisonment and 
barred him from holding office for having failed to perform his 
duties after his 2006 refusal to preside in a courtroom where a 
crucifix was displayed.  On January 30, 2008, a local police 
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The trick loses its persuasiveness when the religious 
meaning is too overt.  The claim that the crucified Christ 
simply stands for civic values is one that cannot be made 
with a straight face.53  
Given demographic shifts, Italy is going to be pushed 
in the direction of abstraction, just as the United States 
has.  Italy’s basic problem is that its civil religion is 
more specific, less Unitarian, than America’s has been.  
There’s no obvious way out of this.  Because of the 
religious specificity of the historical symbol, 
grandfathering won’t work as well as it has in the United 
States, though even here it hasn’t made everyone happy. But 
some way to move toward greater abstraction has got to be 
invented. 
I can’t say much here about the possibilities of human 
inventiveness, but one notable experiment was a Milan 
clinic manager’s attempt to replace crucifixes with 
pictures of the Madonna, “an image which appeals to Muslim 
women as well.”54  The manager was promptly overruled and 
nothing came of the proposal, but it is intriguing.  A 
Madonna is easily pictured merely as a mother and child, an 
image that has an appeal that transcends Catholicism.  It 
may be ambiguous enough to satisfy the requirement of 
increasing abstraction.  From across the Atlantic, I can’t 
tell if the manager is right, but what he is attempting is 
the kind of studied vagueness that Italy needs. 
 
B.  Funding religion 
  
 American practice also can help with the difficult 
question whether the state can permissibly fund religious 
activities.  In Italy, a religious community can receive 
funding, through a voluntary checkoff on tax returns, if it 
so requests.  In order to receive these benefits, the group 
                                                                                                                                                 
officer in Catania appealed the ruling of a civil court stating a 
crucifix and a statue of Mary could be displayed in public 
offices. In 2006 the Council of State, the national appeals court 
for administrative cases, rejected a request made by a mother to 
remove crucifixes from her children's classrooms. The court 
determined that the presence of religious symbols in public 
buildings is not discriminatory as they epitomize civil values. 
 
Id. 
53 The privileged status of Catholicism is even starker where state 
pensions are available to certain Catholic families, but not to 
similarly situated non-Catholic families.  See Ferrari ms. at 15-16. 
54 Milan Clinic in Crucifix Row, ANSA English Media Service, May 9, 
2007. 
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must reach an accord with the government.  The consequence 
is that there are two classes of religion in Italy, those 
that have reached an accord with the government and those 
that have not.  Notably, no accord has yet been reached 
with Islam. 
 The pressure to reach such an accord has produced a 
vexing predicament for the government.  Italian Muslims are 
drawn from many countries, dispersed across Italy, and not 
cohesive or organized.  “Twenty years after the first 
massive wave of Muslim immigration,” a Hudson Institute 
report states, “Italy’s Muslim community is characterized 
by the presence of many Muslim organizations, none of which 
can legitimately claim to represent more than a fraction of 
it. Moreover, the relationships among these organizations 
are often characterized by sharp disagreements and even 
personal hatreds, leaving the country’s Muslim community 
deprived of a unified leadership.”55   The Muslim 
organization with the largest following, the UCOII (Union 
of the Islamic Communities and Organizations of Italy), has 
links with the Muslim Brotherhood and has sometimes 
endorsed suicide bombings and strong anti-Semitism.  Most 
Italian Muslims do not appear to share UCOII’s politicized 
view of Islam, but it is the organization with the 
strongest claim to an accord with the government.  Such an 
accord would make UCOII the sole official representative of 
the country’s Muslim community. 
Only UCOII, for example, would choose the curriculum 
for the teaching of Islam in public schools, appoint 
imams serving in hospitals, prisons and the military, 
and celebrate weddings according to the Islamic rite 
that would have legal value. This position of virtual 
monopoly that UCOII would gain from such an agreement 
would not be accepted by minority groups within 
Italian Islam (such as Shia, Sufis, or Ahmadiyya), nor 
by all those Sunni Muslims—and they seem to be the 
majority—who do not share UCOII’s conservative 
interpretation of Islam. Strong pressures on the 
Italian authorities to turn down UCOII’s proposals 
have come, in fact, from various members of the 
Italian Muslim community and from the Muslim 
governments whose ambassadors sit on the board of the 
                                                 
55 Lorenzo Vidino, Islam, Islamism, and Jihad in Italy (Aug. 4, 2008), 
available at http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/detail/islam-
islamism-and-jihadism-in-italy; for another analysis that reaches 
similar conclusions, see James A. Toronto, Islam Italiano:  Prospects 
for Integration of Muslims in Italy’s Religious Landscape, 28 J. Muslim 
Minority Aff. 61 (2008). 
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Rome Grand Mosque and whose ideological and political 
rivalry with UCOII has always been one of the main 
challenges to the creation of a unified Muslim 
leadership in Italy.56 
Thus the government has declined to sign an accord with 
UCOII.  But so long as there is no accord, Islam will have 
a second-class status in Italian law.  None of the options 
are attractive. 
 In American law, the Supreme Court struggled for years 
with the question whether the state may fund religious 
activities, such as religious schools.  For years, it tried 
to determine whether state funding was directly or 
indirectly supporting religious activity, without coherent 
result.57  It’s clear that some direct support must be 
permissible.  The fire department isn’t required to stand 
aside and watch the church burn, even though when it puts 
out the fire, state funds are directly aiding religion. 
 On this basis, in Mitchell v. Helms,58 a four-justice 
plurality of the Supreme Court suggested that a valid 
secular purpose can validate a program that directly aids 
religious activities.  The argument is that equal access is 
as neutral as anything can be.  But there is a danger that 
such programs will lead to religious oppression, by in 
effect creating a union of church and state that oppresses 
nonadherents of the majority creed.  Thus, for example, a 
school voucher program, such as that which the Court upheld 
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,59 could lead to a situation in 
which the only good schools in a given area are pervasively 
religious, thereby forcing parents who want a decent 
education for their children to accept a religious 
education from a denomination whose doctrines it rejects.  
Forced religious indoctrination is one of the core evils 
that the establishment clause is aimed at preventing.  
Justice O’Connor, concurring in Zelman, suggested that the 
test was whether a program in fact offered “genuine 
nonreligious options.”60 
 The difficulties of recognizing religions one at a 
time are avoided by the American approach, which precludes 
recognizing specific religious groups.  In the United 
States, each church needs to raise its own funds, though 
                                                 
56 Vidino, Islam, Islamism, and Jihad in Italy. 
57 The case law and its pathologies are well described in Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 
22-50 (2007). 
58 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
59 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
60 Id. at 676. 
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contributions are tax deductible.  This has an obvious 
advantage over the Italian solution: the state doesn’t have 
to decide, at least for funding purposes, what counts as a 




 The appropriate specification of the relation between 
state and religion will always reflect the particular needs 
of political life at specific times and places, and depend 
on local conditions, above all religious demographics.  But 
there is enough typicality to the problems presented that 
cross-national comparison, and even advice, is possible. 
 
